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BROWN

ANDERS WALKER

ABSTRACT

In 1955, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer released a controversial film
about juvenile delinquency entitled Blackboard Jungle. Georgia
Governor Ernest Vandiver subsequently used the film as a
metaphor for what would happen to southern schools were Brown
v. Board of Education enforced, marking the beginnings of a much
larger campaign to articulate southern resistance to integration in
racially neutral, quasi-medical terms. Taking Blackboard Jungle
as a starting point, this article recovers the intersection between
discourses of delinquency and desegregation at mid-century,
showing how civil rights groups and segregationists alike both
drew from popular culture and developmental psychology to
advance their constitutional agendas.
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BLACKBOARD JUNGLE:
DELINQUENCY, DESEGREGATION, AND THE BIO-POLITICS OF BROWN

ANDERS WALKER♦

INTRODUCTION
In 1955, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer released a controversial
film about juvenile delinquency entitled Blackboard Jungle.1 Set
in an integrated slum high school, the picture told the story of Jack
Didier, a returning World War II veteran assigned the task of
transforming a band of unruly, knife-wielding teenagers into model
students.2 Though Didier succeeds with the help of a young
Sidney Poitier, Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver used the movie
as a negative symbol of what integrated schools would become in a
speech to state legislators in 1960, arguing that if Brown were
upheld “an environment of switchblade knives, marijuana,
stabbings, rapes, violence and blackboard jungles” would emerge
across the South.3 Interested in proving this to be true, future
Mississippi Governor and United States Representative John Bell
Williams organized a formal inquiry into delinquency in
desegregated schools in Washington D.C., concluding that
♦
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integration heightened racial tension and accelerated juvenile
crime.4
Though historians have documented the moral panic
surrounding juvenile delinquency in the 1950s, few have chosen to
look at intersections between discourses of delinquency and
desegregation at mid-century.5 Yet, such intersections cast new
light on at least three important aspects of the constitutional history
of the period. One, they help show why Thurgood Marshall
decided to focus on arguably dubious sociological arguments about
child psychology in Brown v. Board of Education.6 Two, they
suggest that popular culture became bound up in the constitutional
politics of the time, as both civil rights activists and segregationists
harnessed popular outrage and fear over delinquent youth.7 Three,
intersections between delinquency and desegregation indicate that
Brown not only engendered resistance, but triggered a larger
transformation in areas of state law that had little to do with public
schools.8
4
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To illustrate, as fears of delinquency spiked after Brown,
segregationists split into two camps. Extremists used delinquency
to argue that the Supreme Court should be met with massive
resistance.9 Moderates, by contrast, sponsored state legislation
instituting psychiatric programs, detention centers, and home
welfare services to deal with the delinquency threat.10 Such
moderates, like Virginia’s Kathryn Stone, treated Brown not as an
affront so much as an opportunity, a catalyst for state formation
independent of civil rights.11 Recovering this aspect of Brown is
important not simply because it has gone unrecognized, but
because it provides us with a new paradigm for understanding the
ruling. Rather than simply a civil rights milestone or “hollow
hope,” as Gerald Rosenberg bemoaned, Brown reemerges as an
important agent of non-education related institutional change.12
To explain how this is so, this article will proceed in five
parts. Part I will recover the moral panic over delinquency in the
1950s, describing how it manifested itself in popular culture and
social science. Part II will discuss the manner in which the
NAACP sought to harness popular concerns over delinquency in
its campaign against Jim Crow. Part III will show how southern
extremists countered the NAACP by using cultural portrayals and
scientific studies of delinquency as a modality for combating the
moral claims of civil rights groups. Part IV will discuss the
legislative impact that the delinquency scare had on the South,
focusing on efforts by moderates to expand and improve state
services to children. Part V will show how such responses were
used to disrupt the student sit-ins of 1960, showing how wellintentioned measures found themselves in the service of
reactionary trends, a lost chapter in the history of civil rights.

NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE & POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S (1969); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004).
9
See infra pp. 13-26.
10
See infra pp. 26-34.
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THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994). For Brown as a “hollow hope,” see GERALD
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991).
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I: WILD ONES, DISCOURSES OF DELINQUENCY AT MID-CENTURY
Concerns over juvenile delinquency and crime did not
begin in the 1950s. As early as the 1920s, parents worried about
America’s “flaming youth” being corrupted by jazz, liberal
attitudes towards sex, and illegal alcohol.13 While such fears
continued into the 1930s, a constellation of forces aligned to
elevate concerns over delinquency in the 1950s. First of these was
an actual increase in the rate of juvenile crime. To take just one
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that juvenile
delinquency rose 55 percent between 1952 and 1957.14 Though
this jump coincided with a spike in births following the War, they
still caused considerable alarm. However, that alarm probably
would not have reached the level that it did were it not for a
convergence of other forces.
Perhaps ironically, many of these forces were positive.
Post-war jobs, the G.I. Bill and unprecedented prosperity vaulted
hundreds of thousands of once-poor families into the middle class.
Yet, with middle class status came middle class concerns, in
particular the need to keep children in school, prepare them for
college, and postpone sex and marriage until sufficient career
preparations could be made to prevent a slide back into poverty
and the working class. Complicating this need for parental control
was a conglomeration of other factors, many of them technological
that made the management of teenagers even harder than it might
otherwise have been. The rise of television was one such factor,
facilitating the emergence of an entertainment culture geared
towards children. Two, the mass production of automobiles and
the concomitant move by many families to isolated suburbs
suddenly put teenagers behind the wheel, thereby granting them
unprecedented mobility and freedom. One way that children chose
to express this freedom was through consumer spending, fueling
the creation of teenage markets geared towards the production of
youth-oriented mass culture.15 Such markets fueled sales in music,
literature and film, launching the careers of teenage celebrities like
Chuck Berry, Elvis Presley, Alan Freed, and James Dean; many of
whom flaunted traditional mores in order to profit from teen
rebellion.
Enter the delinquent. Though statistical studies indicate
that rates of youth crime rose only moderately in the 1950s, a
number easily explainable by the fact that baby boomers were
13

GILBERT, OUTRAGE, 3.
PALLADINO, TEENAGERS, 161.
15
See e.g., PALLADINO, TEENAGERS, 10-17.
14
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entering adolescence, the surge in popular concern over
delinquency coincided closely with mass media portrayals of teen
rebellion.16 To take just a few examples, in 1953 Columbia
Pictures released a picture entitled The Wild One based on the true
story of a motorcycle gang’s visit to the small California town of
Hollister. Starring a black-jacketed Marlon Brando, the picture
depicted outright confrontations between teenage bikers and adults
– including menacing shots of gang members roaring through quiet
streets on their motorcycles. To explain such behavior, the film
offered little more than a disturbing nod to nihilism and ennui.
“What are you rebelling against,” asks a teenage girl of Brando at
one point in the film. “What’ve you got?” Brando replies.
A wave of delinquency films ensued, matched by
concomitant trends in popular literature. In fact, one year after
Brando roared across the big screen, Americans read about a band
of uncivilized British schoolboys in a popular novel entitled The
Lord of the Flies.17 Left alone on a tropical island after a plane
crash kills their adult supervisors, the boys attempt to recreate the
middle class world of their parents only to find themselves
devolving into savages. Clad in the remnants of their school
uniforms, they begin worshipping a pig’s head and eventually turn
on their leader, Ralph, who they chase across the island and
attempt to skewer with a stick pointed at both ends.
Although written by British author William Golding, The
Lord of the Flies became a bestseller in the United States. Indeed,
many read the work not only as fiction but a neo-philosophical
exposition of the latent savagery of children. It bolstered already
rampant fears of juvenile delinquency in the United States, many
of which revolved around the question of the socialization and
psychological development of youth.
One year after the
publication of Flies, for example, sociologist Benjamin Fine
published a book entitled 1,000,000 Delinquents, the number that
he predicted would emerge in the United States by 1956. That
same year, Time magazine dedicated a special issue to the problem,
provocatively entitling it Teenagers on the Rampage.18 In 1957,
Cosmopolitan released an entire issue dedicated to adolescence
replete with articles like, “Are You Afraid of Your Teenager?”19
Hollywood contributed significantly to fears of
delinquency. Drawing from the same discourses of savagery and
16

For example, while the FBI reported that juvenile delinquency rose 55 percent
between 1952 and 1957, the majority of reported crimes were vaguely described
as incorrigible behavior, disorderly conduct and violation of curfew.
PALLADINO, TEENAGERS, 161.
17
WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1954).
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Are You Afraid of your Teenager? COSMOPOLITAN, Vol. 143 (November
1957).
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primitivism that had animated The Lord of the Flies and The Wild
One, MGM released Blackboard Jungle in 1955. One year later
MGM released Rock, Rock, Rock, a rambunctious movie about
high school life featuring a tongue-in-cheek performance by a
young Frankie Lymon singing “I’m not a Juvenile Delinquent.”
That same year, Warner Brothers issued a full-color film about a
disenchanted teenager who rejects his middle class parents for his
high school friends, one of whom shoots another teenager not long
after the protagonist accidentally causes the death of a rival in a
motorized game of chicken. Named for a 1944 study of juvenile
delinquency called Rebel Without a Cause: The Hypnoanalysis of
a Criminal Psychopath, the movie starred Yale Drama graduate
James Dean and became an instant hit.20
Juvenile responses to media portrayals of delinquent
culture like Rebel proved troubling to many. In one of the worst
examples, a teenager in a high school in Indiana, Pennsylvania
copied the shooting portrayed in Rebel, resulting in the death of a
classmate in 1956.21 Though such crimes were rare, it became
common for teenagers to take over movie theaters, dancing in the
aisles to rock ‘n’ roll soundtracks by artists like Bill Haley and
Chuck Berry.22 The National Congress of Parents and Teachers,
the Girl Scouts and the Daughters of the American Revolution all
denounced Blackboard. In fact, Clare Booth Luce, America’s
ambassador to Italy became so afraid that Blackboard might
compromise America’s Cold War image that she had it withdrawn
from the Venice Film Festival in 1956.23
As Americans recoiled from cinematic portrayals of wild
ones and blackboard jungles, many struggled to understand what
was causing children to revolt. In 1953, this led to the creation of a
Senate Subcommittee assigned to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency. Led by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefavuer, the
committee issued a report identifying mass culture, including
pornography, as well as drugs to be causes of delinquency. “In
New York,” asserted the report, “we were informed by those who
chart the course of juvenile misbehavior that after World War II
there was a decidedly discernible trend to the use of marihuana.
This was followed by progression to the use of heroin but in the
last 3 or 4 years, sexual excesses and perversion have moved to the
fore as the complex evil with which the authorities must cope.
20

ROBERT M. LINDNER, REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE: THE HYPNOANALYSIS OF A
CRIMINAL PSYCHOPATH (1944).
21
GILBERT, OUTRAGE, 188.
22
For a description of Blackboard Jungle and its impact on audiences around the
country, see GILBERT, OUTRAGE, 183-9 and PALLADINO, TEENAGERS, 126-7,
160.
23
These reactions are all documented by James Gilbert in Cycle of Outrage,
185.
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Lamentably there are all too many sex orgies involving teen-agers
and this trend to perversion coincides definitely with the
tremendous output of pornography.”24
Sex orgies, and sexual deviance in general, became a focal
point of the committee’s hearings in 1956. Of particular interest
were the paths down which children could be led to delinquency.
“Doctor, could you tell us, is there a growing tendency today
toward sex deviations?” asked Kefauver, directing his question to
Dr. George W. Henry, professor of clinical psychiatry at Cornell
University. “That is my impression,” responded Henry. “From
your experience can you tell us what age groups is most
susceptible to deviation?” continued the Tennessee Senator.
“Adolescence,” responded Dr. Henry.25 “Can such deviation from
the normal manifest itself in a number of forms?” asked Kefauver,
“Yes,” replied Henry. Are people born with such perversion bred
in them, or must they be taught and educated along this line?”26 “I
could scarcely imagine that anyone was born with these
tendencies,” replied the Cornell psychiatrist, “There may be certain
potentialities that can be trained, but I don’t believe anybody
would arrive at these various deviations unless they had some
training.”27
The Committee’s interest in training, and in particular the
idea that children could be trained into deviance, reflected a larger
belief in the fragile psychology of children at the time, and in
particular the idea that children could be profoundly influenced by
their surroundings. As Dr. Benjamin Karpman, chief
psychotherapist at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C. told
the subcommittee, “you can take a perfectly healthy boy or girl and
by exposing them to abnormalities you can virtually crystallize and
settle their habits for the rest of their lives. If they are not exposed
to that they may develop to perfectly healthy, normal citizens.”28
Developmental psychology coincided nicely with the
concerns of middle class parents. In fact, medical authorities
taught parents to be on the alert not only for adult subjects like
pornography but other media that might taint children. Among
these were television programs, children’s movies, and, perhaps
most significant, comic books. One social scientist in particular, a
psychiatrist named Fredric Wertham, transformed concerns over
comics into nothing less than a national scandal.
24

“Obscene and Pornographic Literature and Juvenile Delinquency,” Interim
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary made by its Subcommittee to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, June 28, 1956, (Washington DC, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 8.
25
Id. , p. 9.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. , p. 12.
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A German émigré, Wertham possessed a profound mistrust
of the effects that mass culture had on everyday people. Although
he had left Germany long before the rise of the Nazis, he, like
other German émigrés, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer
among them, was alarmed at the way in which the National
Socialists employed mass culture to indoctrinate average German
people. The Nazis’ decision to use graphic art, the media, and
public drama to bring Germans to a frenzy of genocidal
nationalism led the scientists to be suspicious of the effects of mass
culture on Americans as well.29 Consequently, as fears of juvenile
delinquency began to surge in the 1950s, Wertham focused his
attention on a genre of illustrated serial known as the crime comic.
Crime comics, with titles like Tales from the Crypt, Reform School
Girl and Crime Detective presented children with sexually charged
accounts of murder, rape and torture. In 1954, they constituted a
major portion of a 60,000,000 comic book per month market.
leading Wertham to publish a book on the subject entitled
Seduction of the Innocent. “Even more than crime,” wrote
Wertham, “juvenile delinquency reflects the social values current
in a society. Both adults and children absorb these social values in
their daily lives, at home, in school, at work, and also in all the
communications imparted as entertainment, instruction or
propaganda through the mass media, from the printed word to
television.”30
In part due to its emphasis on mass conditioning, The
Seduction of the Innocent received widespread acclaim and
transformed Wertham into a popular authority not only on comic
books, but the social psychiatry of children in general.31 For a
nation seized by concern over errant youth, Wertham gave
structure to popular fears by rooting delinquency not in nebulous
forces, but distinct, controllable causes. As he summarized in
Seduction, “You cannot understand or remedy a social
phenomenon like delinquency by redefining it simply as an
individual emotional disorder. It is on the basis of such an
approach, however, that important mass influences on the child’s
mind have for years been completely overlooked.”32
Because of his interest in the effect that “mass influences”
had on children’s minds, Wertham attracted the attention of civil
rights advocates. Indeed, as the next section will show, Wertham’s
29

For a classic example of Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno’s critique of
mass culture see their essay The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass
Deception, reprinted in MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES: KEYWORKS,
Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Dougles M. Kellner, eds., (2001), 71-101.
30
FREDERIC WERTHAM, THE SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT, (1954), 149.
31
For a description of the popularity and influence of Wertham’s work, see
James GILBERT, OUTRAGE, 103-4.
32
WERTHAM, SEDUCTION, 156-7.
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work garnered him an invitation from NAACP lawyer Jack
Greenberg who hoped that he might be able to testify in the
Delaware portion of Brown v. Board of Education. The legal
system known as Jim Crow, believed Greenberg, had negative
mass psychological effects.

II: THE NAACP TAPS WERTHAM
The importance of mass influences on the minds of
children, a core component of Frederic Wertham’s social
psychiatry, was of interest not only to parents worried about the
effects that comic books had on children, but African Americans
fighting segregation. In 1896, the Supreme Court had ruled that
segregation, as long as it was equal, did not injure either blacks or
whites.33 As early as the 1930s, scientific evidence began to
suggest that this was in fact not the case.34 By the 1950s, this
evidence was beginning to gain increasing credibility in the field of
clinical psychiatry, partly due to Wertham’s own work in New
York. Thanks to the support of black writers Richard Wright and
Ralph Ellison, Wertham opened a psychiatric clinic in Harlem
designed to provide free psychiatric services to African Americans
in 1946.35
Called the Lafargue Clinic after Paul Lafargue, a black,
Cuban-born physician who married Karl Marx’s daughter,
Wertham joined fourteen other volunteer psychiatrists as well as
twelve social workers in the basement of St. Philips Parish House
on West 133rd Street.36 They charged twenty-five cents per
consultation, but only for those patients who could pay. For those
who could not, it was free.37 In 1951, NAACP lawyer Jack
Greenberg contacted Wertham to see if he might bring black
school children from Delaware to be examined at the clinic.
Greenberg’s request derived from a larger theory developed by
Thurgood Marshall that the best way to attack segregation was to
argue that it caused psychological harm to black children. “I told
the staff that we had to try this case just like any other one in
which you would try to prove damages to your client,” explained
Marshall, “[i]f your car ran over my client, you’d have to pay up,
and my function as an attorney would be to put experts on the
33

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See DARYL SCOTT, CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE OF
THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE 1880-1996 (1997), 57-8.
35
BEATY, WERTHAM, 89.
36
BEATY, WERTHAM, 17, 89.
37
Id.
34
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stand to testify to how much damages was done. We needed
exactly that kind of evidence in the school cases.”38
To support the theory that segregation damaged black
youth, the NAACP not only sent black children to be examined in
New York, but invited Wertham down to serve as an expert
witness in Delaware. Wertham testified in Belton v. Gebhart, the
Delaware portion of the series of cases that would eventually be
consolidated into Brown v. Board of Education.39 In his testimony,
Wertham contended that although “the physical differences”
between black and white schools in Delaware was “not at all
really material” it was nevertheless true that “segregation in
general” was “anti-educational.”40 By this he meant that “most of
the children” that he examined “interpret segregation in one way
and only one way – and that is they interpret it as punishment.”41
Whether the state of Delaware wanted to punish black children or
not, continued Wertham, had “nothing to do with it.”42 What he
was interested in was “what is in the minds of children.”43
Though Wertham’s testimony stemmed from examinations
that he had conducted on black children at Lafargue, he
incorporated his critique of mass culture and comic books into his
testimony. Legal segregation, argued Wertham, acted like comic
books in the sense that it was an exterior factor that influenced the
minds of children on a mass level. Further, many comics,
continued Wertham, actually included racist themes, a claim he
supported by submitting several crime comics depicting blacks as
savages into evidence.44
Though Jack Greenberg later recalled that Wertham
“captivated” the courtroom, his testimony became overshadowed
by that of Columbia sociologist Kenneth B. Clark.45 Clark, along
with his wife Mamie, gained notoriety by employing colored dolls
to also gauge the effects of racism on black children. Specifically,
Clark presented black children with different colored dolls and ask
them which was more attractive. Frequently, black children would
select the white doll, indicating that even though they were black,
38

Richard Kluger interview with Thurgood Marshall, reprinted in SIMPLE
JUSTICE, 316.
39
Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A2d 862, Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka, 347
U.S. 483.
40
Frederic Wertham, testimony, Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, trial
transcript.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
For more on Wertham’s work at Lafargue see Gilbert, Cycle of Outrage:
America’s Response to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s, 95-97; and Kluger,
Simple Justice, 442.
45
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS, 137.
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they had been socialized to think that white was aesthetically
superior.46
Rather than dismiss the sociological evidence presented by
the NAACP, the Supreme Court of the United States relied on it in
Brown.47 “Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools,” asserted Chief Justice Earl Warren, two years after
Wertham testified in Delaware, “has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children.”48 This effect was “greater,” argued Wertham,
when it had “the sanction of the law” because such sanction tended
to denote “the inferiority of the Negro group” and therefore had a
tendency to “retard the educational and mental development of
Negro children.”49 “Whatever may have been the extent of
psychological knowledge of the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,”
46

It is important to note here that this constituted, in certain ways, a return of the
social sciences into the realm of politics. During the interwar years, as Daryl
Scott observes, many social scientists retreated from progressive era notions that
academic work should be directly linked to political action. See SCOTT,
CONTEMPT, 57-8. This retreat coincided with the Depression and the
concomitant class-based politics of the New Deal. For a brief moment that was
uncharacteristic of its laissez-faire, pro-corporate traditions, in other words,
America substituted Marx for Freud and looked critically at the nation’s
economic apparatus. Jonathan Holloway shows how this coincided with the rise
of three social scientists who did not retreat from politics, Ralph Bunche, E.
Franklin Frazier and Abram Harris, all of whom emphasized the centrality of
class to understanding society. See JONATHAN HOLLOWAY, CONFRONTING THE
VEIL: ABRAM HARRIS, JR., E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, AND RALPH BUNCHE, 19191941 (2002). Perhaps not surprisingly, the work of these social scientists, in
particular Frazier, was misappropriated and distorted in the post-War, Civil
Rights Era, as America, in a Cold War frenzy, abandoned Marx and returned to
Freud. The fact that the NAACP participated in this trend by turning to child
psychology reveals the extent to which it understood Cold War politics and
sought consistently to remain politically viable by framing its own agendas in
the larger political, discursive context of the time. Penny Von Eschen discusses
this shift in NAACP strategies directly in RACE AGAINST EMPIRE: BLACK
AMERICANS AND ANTICOLONIALISM, 1937-1957 (1997), 109-10.
47
Daryl Scott provides an excellent discussion of just how unconvincing much
of the social science evidence presented in Brown really was. See SCOTT,
CONTEMPT, 121-130. Given the indeterminacy of the evidence, Scott goes on to
argue convincingly that the Court’s turn to social psychology constituted a
shrewd political move made by a consummately political court. It sought to
walk a tightrope between growing national and international calls to end Jim
Crow, while at the same time seeking to minimize white resistance in the South.
By introducing the psychological development of black children into the Court’s
rationale, in other words, Chief Justice and former Governor of California Earl
Warren sought both to invoke sympathy for black children as well as to avoid
blasting southern whites. Under Brown, white southerners were not morally
wrong to support segregation, they were simply scientifically incorrect. Daryl
Scott makes a convincing cases for the argument that Warren relied on theories
of psychological damage at least in part to reduce resistance by southern whites
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continued Warren, “this finding is amply supported by modern
authority.” To support its assertion, the Court cited a string of
sociological studies, gathering them in footnote eleven of its
ruling.50
Footnote eleven proved critical to Brown’s holding. This
was because the NAACP had chosen to argue that the disparate
impact of segregation on white and black children violated their
right to equal protection under the law, as set forth in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Without some kind of evidence that this
was true, the NAACP’s constitutional claim might have collapsed.
And, although the NAACP could have argued that school facilities
were unequal, they chose not to out of fear that the South would
simply funnel money into improving black schools, preserving
segregation in the process. By turning to psychiatric testimony
like Wertham’s, the NAACP could argue that segregation harmed
black children regardless of whether their facilities were inferior or
not.

III: THE EXTREMIST RESPONSE
Upon reading Earl Warren’s reference to social science in
footnote eleven, many white southerners were shocked.51 “I
50
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submit that white children also have rights,” proclaimed
Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland only weeks after Brown
was handed down.52 “[T]ensions and frictions generally found in
an interracial school,” continued Eastland, “certainly will have a
bad effect on a white child, and in my judgment will interfere with
the white child’s ability to learn.”53 South Carolina journalist
William D. Workman echoed Eastland’s concerns in a book that
earned him region-wide acclaim. “[T]he integrationists, who cry
for racial admixture in the cause of bolstering the personality
development of a Negro minority,” complained Workman, “do not
hesitate to compel the mingling of a white minority with a black
majority without any consideration of the inevitable psychological
impact upon the personalities of the white children. Indeed, there
has been monumental indifference on the part of the race-mixers
concerning the likelihood of adverse psychological effects upon
white children.”54
Southern leaders became particularly enraged at the Court’s
use of developmental psychology in overturning a legal system of
social organization that had been in place for half a century.55
Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook, speaking at a
segregationist rally of 8,000 people in New Orleans in 1956,
lamented the fact that, in his view, “the justices based their
decision not upon any premise or tenet of law, but solely upon
sociological and psychological theories.”56 South Carolina Senator
Olin D. Johnston reiterated this sentiment. “When I became a
United States Senator,” declared Johnston, “I took an oath to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States” but this
reject the intangible strategy. Yet social science existed not simply as a body of
literature but also as a socially identifiable community whose members were
part of the larger political culture. Much to the good fortune of the
integrationists and to the detriment of the segregationists, postwar social science
was virtually a one-party state in favor of the racial liberals’ goal of
desegregation.” Scott, Contempt and Pity, 125.
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did not include supporting “sociological pronouncements of a
Supreme Court” that replaced law with arbitrary “judicial
dictatorship.”57
Outrage at the Court’s reliance on social psychiatry joined
with other contentions, among them the idea that the Court had
overstepped its bounds and transgressed states’ rights. The end
result of this anger was nothing less than a region-wide political
backlash that culminated in a political program of massive
resistance.58 Coined by Virginia Senator Harry Flood Byrd,
massive resistance referred to a policy of total defiance of the
Court. Its center-piece was interposition, a theory devised by
Virginian James Jackson Kilpatrick that declared Brown invalid on
constitutional grounds.59
While outrage at the Court’s reliance on social science
contributed to massive resistance, it also triggered a more
discursive move aimed at articulating why, precisely, southerners
opposed integration. This move, pioneered by moderates and
conservatives alike, borrowed from the NAACP’s own strategies
in Brown and attempted to communicate with white Americans
outside the South. “Our only hope at present,” announced Emory
Rogers, one of the attorneys who had represented South Carolina
in Brown, “lies not in the carrying on of the battle in the courts”
but rather in taking “the battle to the people and using the same
psychological and sociological warfare that has been so
successfully carried on against us, i.e., the principles of mass
psychology expressed through organized public opinion.” 60
Undergirding calls for mass psychology was a notion shared by
many segregationists that America had forgotten what race really
was. Race was not simply a matter of superficial differences in
color argued opponents of integration in the South, but a
classification that incorporated much deeper differences in
intellect, behavior, and morality. Though blacks were advancing,
57
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argued many southern leaders, they still had not attained the
standards possessed by most white people. Awareness of such low
standards, segregationists feared, had been forgotten by whites in
the North and ignored by the judges on the Supreme Court.
If white people around the country only knew the truth about
racial disparities, concluded segregationists like Jim Eastland, then
they would join the South in resisting integration. “We have to go
into the north,” asserted Eastland, “and carry the fight into every
section of the United States. What divides the two areas of our
country is that in each area the people think that those in the other
area do not think as they do, when in reality we all think alike.”61
Others agreed. “For long enough now the South has been on the
receiving end of unwarranted, uncharitable and basically a
uniformed barrage of political, economic, social and educational
propaganda,” wrote William D. Workman in 1955, “The time is at
hand for a counter-attack.”62
A growing, and indeed prescient belief that whites outside the
South shared no deep sympathy for civil rights and could therefore
be recruited to the Southern cause, inspired action. Indeed, rather
than wait for other strategies of massive resistance to play
themselves out, segregationists began rearticulating the basis for
their racism immediately, bolstering it not with vitriolic rhetoric
but rational resuscitations of statistics and direct references to
juvenile delinquency.63 One of the most skillful proponents of this
approach was United States Representative from Mississippi, John
Bell Williams.
Born in Hinds County, Mississippi, Williams entered five
articles from the Jackson Daily News into the Congressional
Record in January 1956. Each article described a different horror
story stemming from racial conflicts in Washington DC, all under
the heading “The Sordid Picture of Integration in the Nation’s
Capital.”64 Williams’s focus on DC stemmed from the fact that the
District of Columbia had begun to desegregate in 1954, long
before any southern state. President Eisenhower, somewhat
optimistically, had claimed that DC would be a model for
integration across the country, an assertion that invited scrutiny
from southern whites, particularly those interested in conveying to
the rest of America the social implications of sending white
61
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children to black schools. “The records show that around 75
percent of Washington crime is committed by Negroes,” asserted
one of the pieces submitted by Williams, “Negroes commit about 5
murders to every 1 for the whites. Rape cases of record show
Negroes leading at the rate of about 7 to 1. This does not include
the unreported rape cases which white victims – mostly school
students – decided to remain quiet rather than subject themselves
to the public disgrace they would have to bear through no fault of
their own.”65 Two months later, Williams went into more depth,
openly blasting the Court for not acknowledging racial difference.
“Those who are farthest removed from the segregation problem,”
asserted Williams in a speech entitled “Where is the Reign of
Terror?” “are the first to come forward with solutions to it, none of
which suggest that those who must live with the problem should be
consulted . . . The time has come for the light of truth to penetrate
the iron curtain that has been thrown around the facts regarding
racial differences and distinctions.”66
Such facts, continued Williams, had been obfuscated by the
northern press, intent on excoriating the South for wrong-doing,
yet could be found in the official records of the United States
Department of Justice and in particular the Annual Report of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. According to these publications,
Williams asserted, “Negroes comprise 10 percent of the total
population of the United States. Yet, as the above table shows,
Negroes committed more than half the homicides, both murder and
manslaughter, in our country in 1950. This 10 percent of our
population is also responsible as this table shows, for a
disproportionate share of crimes committed.”67
Black crime rates, which were higher than white crime
rates, served Williams well. They gave him something concrete to
hang a rationale for resistance on, not to mention a statistical spear
on which to skewer the Supreme Court.
“[I]n spite of the
Supreme Court’s high-phrased sociological findings,” argued
Williams, “the fact remains that there exist ethnic differences
between the Caucasian and the Negro race which cannot be
changed by the hand of man.”68 Implicit in Williams’s remarks
lurked a sleight of hand. By citing statistics, he sought to bolster
the South’s position with the rational discourse of social science.
He sought, in essence, to prove that white southerners adhered to
the policies that they did because of scientifically supportable
65
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differences in black behavior. This move, which reframed
southern racism in terms of rational choice rather than irrational
prejudice, carefully avoided exploring the possibility that black
crime and illegitimacy rates may have been symptomatic of factors
other than race.
That they were more linked to institutional
racism, structural inequality, or economic class, rather than
genetics, was not something that Williams mentioned.
Ignoring these possibilities, Williams entered a speech by
fellow Congressman from Georgia James C. Davis into the
Congressional Record citing further statistics on black behavior.
“It is well known,” explained Davis’s speech, “that the crime rate
among Negroes far exceeds that of whites. . . . Crime statistics
show that throughout the years the Negroes in Washington have
committed the bulk of the crimes of violence, although they have
about one-third of the population. In 1955 out of 11,072 crimes of
violence, or part I offenses, 9,056 were by Negroes. This is 82
percent of the total.”69
Whites and blacks also differed in terms of sexual morality.
“That a double moral standard exists in the behavior of the white
and colored races can hardly be denied,” continued Williams,
again turning to social science evidence by entering black
illegitimacy rates into the Record.70 “If these statistics can be
taken as indicative of the moral atmosphere that exists in
Washington’s integrated school system,” he continued,
emphasizing that black illegitimacy rates were ten times that of
whites, “is there any wonder that the segregated suburbs are
growing by leaps and bounds?”71
Williams’s insinuation that white flight out of D.C. schools
stemmed from fears of black sexual promiscuity successfully
reframed the rationale behind segregation in the prevailing
discourse of social science. In particular, it used statistics to
suggest that racial segregation was not a repressive mechanism, but
rather a protective device that shielded white students from social
ills endemic to the black community. This claim had long been
made in the South, and had in fact facilitated the birth of Jim Crow
over half a century before. Further, by introducing the subject of
white flight, Williams sought to show that massive resistance to
integration was not simply the product of an ingrained, irrational
prejudice unique to southern whites. On the contrary, it was a
rational strategy practiced even by whites outside the South,
because of racial difference.
69
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Beneath the rational, scientific gloss that Williams put on
his exposition of white flight from DC schools, lay a larger
discourse on race and sexuality that had long haunted the South.
Indeed, by framing the threat of integration in sexual terms,
Williams fell back on fears of black sexuality and miscegenation
that had existed since slavery.72 These fears had, consistently
throughout southern history, served to legitimate racial repression,
revealing continuity not only in racial thought but also political
strategy in the 1950s. Despite this continuity, there was also
change. Fears of interracial sex at the turn of the century, for
example, emerged primarily in the imagery of rape. These fears
were closely linked to a larger national discourse on civilization
and savagery, undergirded by the theories of men like William
Graham Sumner and A.G. Keller, that framed blacks as primitive
beasts who had to be socially contained.73 Segregationists in the
1950s, although they drew indirectly from this discourse, retailored fears of rape to fit the prevailing discourses of child
psychology that animated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown.
Although Williams insinuated that the consequences of integration
possessed a sexual component, for example, he did not claim, like
his nineteenth century precursors would have done, that integration
would lead necessarily to rape. On the contrary, his citation of
statistics on pregnancy, along with his assertion that blacks
possessed a double moral standard, coincided with a slightly
different articulation. No longer at risk of simply being raped,
white girls, and white boys too for that matter, also risked, much
like Tom P. Brady had suggested in his Black Monday speech,
being seduced.
Beneath this rather lurid reason for not supporting
integration, lurked a larger, more credible theory: children were
profoundly influenced by their surroundings; and particular
surroundings could result in proclivities for particular things.
Williams realized that while whites around the country might agree
with abstract notions of racial equality, they would have a harder
time adhering to idealistic principles when the fate of their own
72
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children was at stake. Arguably, this was one of the weaker points
of Brown, since it placed children, not adults on the front-lines of
integration, a policy agenda that promised not simply to improve
the education of blacks, but transform the socialization of children,
both black and white.
To impress upon America the consequences that integration
might have on white children and to rearticulate the southern
defense of segregation in rational terms, Williams initiated a study
of integrated schools in Washington DC. This study, sponsored by
the House Subcommittee to Investigate Public School Standards
and Conditions and Juvenile Delinquency in DC, was authored by
Williams and three other white southern congressmen: Joel T.
Broyhill of Virginia, Woodrow Jones of North Carolina, and James
C. Davis of Georgia. Two other congressmen, DeWitt Hyde from
Maryland and A.L. Miller of Nebraska, also belonged to the
committee, but refused to sign the report.
The subcommittee’s report was a segregationist
masterpiece. It documented rampant delinquency among black
students, some of it violent and most of it sexual. “Discipline
problems and delinquency resulting from the integration of the
schools have been appalling,” asserted the report.74 “Prior to the
integration of the schools in the District of Columbia there were
very few unusual disciplinary problems in either of the school
systems,” continued the subcommittee, “Since the integration of
the schools there have been very few unusual disciplinary
problems in the predominately segregated schools. Disciplinary
problems in the predominately integrated schools,” by contrast,
“have been described as appalling, demoralizing, intolerable, and
disgraceful.”75
Among the problems cited in the report were “fighting,
lying, stealing, vandalism, obscene writing, vulgar talking,
absenteeism, tardiness, and truancy,” as well as more serious
offenses.76 Of particular concern were offenses revolving around
sex. “[S]ex problems in the predominately integrated schools have
become a matter of vital concern to the parents,” announced the
report, suddenly turning to statistics, “[o]ne out of every four
Negro children born in the District of Columbia is illegitimate.
The number of cases of venereal disease among Negroes of school
age has been found to be astounding and tragic. The Negro has
demonstrated a sex attitude from the primary to high school grades
74
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that has greatly alarmed white parents and is a contributing cause
of the exodus of the white residents of the District of Columbia.”77
“The evidence, taken as a whole,” continued the report, now citing
statistics on black arrest records, test scores, venereal disease rates,
etc, “points to a definite impairment of educational opportunities
for members of both white and Negro races as a result of
integration, with little prospect for remedy in the future.
Therefore, we recommend that racially separate public schools be
reestablished for the education of white and Negro pupils in the
District of Columbia, and that such schools be maintained on a
completely separate and equal basis.”78
DeWitt Hyde and A.L. Miller, both of whom refused to
sign the final report, disagreed. “Since we have not signed the
majority report submitted by the staff of the subcommittee,” noted
the two non-southerners in an addendum, “we desire to offer the
following observations.”79 “We have carefully read the hearings,
report, and the recommendations made by the staff and the
subcommittee,” they asserted, and yet “[w]e have a feeling that a
more objective approach would uncover some good things in the
educational and social life of the District schools.”80 Although
acknowledging that the statistics cited in the report were true, both
representatives questioned the underlying motivations of their
southern counterparts. “The report seems to blame all of the
educational deficiencies in our school system entirely on the
efforts toward integration,” they lamented, “We cannot believe that
everything that is wrong with the educational system can be
blamed on integration.” Further, “[I]n a close reading of the
hearings, we must come to the conclusion that the technical staff
presented leading questions to a selected group of witnesses.
While we do not doubt the honesty or sincerity of the witnesses
who testified, the testimony does not appear to be well-balanced,
or objective, since persons with views not in accord with those of
the counsel were not given full and fair opportunity to testify.”81
Despite the caveat provided by Hyde and Miller, the 1957
report on integrated schools in DC represented one of the most
sophisticated attempts to rearticulate the South’s position on
integration yet devised. John Bell Williams, the instigator of the
study, effectively linked the South’s fight against integration with
concerns over health and morals that could be understood by white
parents nationwide. One of these concerns was that white children
would be harmed if enrolled in school with blacks. Another was
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that contact with black children would not simply harm white
children, but corrupt them, transforming them into delinquents.
This was the implicit message that Williams delivered when he
assigned his committee to study delinquency and not race in DC
public schools.82
Initiated one year after the release of Blackboard Jungle,
Williams’s study capitalized on national fears of teen rebellion in
schools, linking them to racial integration. As such, it presented
the subtle claim that juvenile delinquency was in fact a form of
degeneration, accelerated by interracial contact. Just as social
psychiatry aided proponents of integration, in other words, so too
did it coincide nicely with concerns of southern segregationists like
John Bell Williams. In fact, it helped Williams and others explain
the consequences that integration would have on white children in
terms that white parents across the country might be more prone to
understand. And, it also helped them turn the NAACP’s claims
about black youth that had been legitimated in Brown upon
themselves. Segregationists like Williams were well aware, for
example, that African Americans working for the NAACP legal
defense fund understood the role that developmental psychology
could play in promoting black political interests. Indeed, this
awareness had led Thurgood Marshal and others to seek out the
psychological experts cited by the Supreme Court in Brown.
And yet, the sociological sword proved double-edged. As
John Bell Williams’s study of juvenile delinquency in Washington
DC schools indicated, the discourse of developmental psychology
could be turned against the black struggle for civil rights as well.
Indeed, even as national hysteria over juvenile delinquency created
opportunities for the NAACP, so too did it reinscribe notions of
racial difference popular in American thought at the time.
To give just a few examples, in 1957 Jack Kerouac wrote a
popular novel about disaffected white youth, passages of which
presented a stylized, romantic portrayal of black culture as a
counterpoint to dull, confining white society. “At lilac evening I
walked with every muscle aching among the lights of the 27th and
82
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Welton in the Denver colored section,” wrote Kerouac in his 1957
classic On The Road, “wishing I were a Negro, feeling that the best
the white world had offered was not enough ecstasy for me, not
enough life, joy, kicks, darkness, music, not enough night.”83
Although few white teens expressed a desire for contrived notions
of black essentialism as eloquently as Kerouac, On The Road
nevertheless reflected a larger sentiment that black culture existed
in opposition to white hegemony.
Norman Mailer agreed. “[I]t is no accident that the source
of Hip is the Negro,” wrote Mailer in a 1956 essay identifying
youth culture as little more than watered-down black culture. “For
Hip is the sophistication of the wise primitive in a giant jungle.”84
In fact, for Mailer, white teenagers who embraced counter-culture
and delinquency were not only wise primitives, they were “white
Negroes.”85
Undergirding Mailer’s notion of white Negroes lurked a
latent racism that southern segregationists would, over the course
of the 50s and 60s, seek to exploit. “Knowing in the cells of his
existence that life is war, nothing but war,” wrote Mailer in a
purple passage, “the Negro could rarely afford the sophisticated
inhibitions of civilization, and so he kept for his survival the art of
the primitive, he lived in the enormous present, he subsisted for his
Saturday night kicks, relinquishing the pleasures of the mind for
the more obligatory pleasures of the body.”86 “[T]he Negro,”
Mailer continued, “not being privileged to gratify his self-esteem
with the heady satisfactions of categorical condemnation, chose to
move instead in that other direction where all situations are equally
valid, and in the worst of perversion, promiscuity, pimpery, drug
addiction, rape, razor-slash, bottle-break, what-have-you, the
Negro discovered and elaborated a morality of the bottom.”87
Notions that blacks inhabited a morality of the bottom
resonated nicely with claims by men like John Bell Williams that
the races were in fact culturally different and that integration,
consequently, would be a disaster. This, of course, was an old
white southern conviction. And yet, John Bell Williams helped
reframe this conviction in the modern discourses of social science,
developmental psychology, and juvenile delinquency.
Not surprisingly, segregationist organizations like the
Mississippi Citizens’ Councils proceeded to adopt Williams’s
report on DC schools as evidence bolstering the ideological
platform of massive resistance. In 1956, the monthly Citizens’
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Council cited the hearings conducted in the House of
Representatives. “[T]he facts about the mess in Washington’s
schools are on the record, and here are some of them,” lamented
the paper, proceeding to cite the testimony of public school
principle John Paul Collins. “The problem of discipline was
tremendous. Colored girls used language worse than any I ever
heard in the Marine Corps. Knifings became more or less
commonplace, and many sex problems were reported during the
first year following integration.”88
One year later, Mississippi Judge and Citizens’ Council
leader Tom Brady used some of Williams’s statistics when he
traveled to California to make the South’s case to an influential
group of conservatives in San Francisco. “An exhaustive study of
the program and results of integration in the schools of
Washington, D.C. which the NAACP and other left wing groups
fostering integration said would be a model for the rest of the
United States to follow,” explained Brady to the prestigious
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, “clearly reveals that the
average white student who was integrated in the class room with
the Negro has been retarded two to three years in his educational
progress.”89 Appropriating the neutral tone of the sociologist,
Brady continue, asserting that “it is not to the best interest of
America that the white children, particularly in certain congested
sections, be retarded three years in their educational advancement.
Never forget that the left-wing socialist groups are forever grading
down, never grading up the intelligence, the industry and the
genius of this country! They wish to equalize, thereby reducing to
a low minimum the intelligence of America.”90
Fear that integration would lead to a lowering of
intelligence was not the only factor, according to Brady, that
compelled white southerners to resist Brown. Morality mattered
too. “The main objection to social integration of the races in our
schools or elsewhere by Southerners,” asserted Brady, citing one
of John Bell Williams’s many excoriations of DC schools, “is for
moral reasons . . . In a remarkable treatise, “Where is the Reign of
Terror?” by Representative John Bell Williams of Mississippi,
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published in the Congressional Record on school integration in
Washington, it is succinctly shown that the white boys and girls of
Washington were subjected to unspeakable vulgarity, immorality
and filth. The truth is often brutal, but I must speak it! As
revealed in this exhaustive study, objectively made, the white
children of Washington D.C. were retarded two to three years in
their educational advancement.
The obscenity, vulgarity,
immorality and brutality which came about requires the constant
maintenance of policemen in the halls and corridors of many of the
schools.”91
After reiterating the conclusions of Williams’s report,
Brady emphasized links between sexual immorality and race.
“The Negro, in so far as sex is concerned, is not immoral, he is
simply non-moral,” asserted Brady, “[h]e merely follows his
natural instincts. The pregnancies and illegitimate births which
have occurred in schools in Washington are not abnormal, they are
merely astounding! . . . [w]e cannot count for naught the natural
indolence and indifference of the Negro’s nature. We cannot
disregard his utter disregard for the laws relating to theft. We
cannot overlook his proclivity for drunkenness and dope addiction.
We cannot overlook his natural tendency to immorality and
violence. And subject our children to the terrible consequences
resulting from such traits through integration.”92 Brady’s address
painted a disturbing portrait, but not a new one. Notions that
African Americans were naturally amoral, had different marriage
patterns, and followed their instincts were all ideas that could be
dated back to the Nineteenth Century.
But that wasn’t the only parallel to the past in Brady’s
speech. In his conclusion, he invoked the rural alliance between
the South and West that had resisted Al Smith’s liberalism in the
1920s. “If this country is to be saved from Communism,”
admonished Brady, in closing, “It must be saved by the white
people of the South and West. We did not ask for this burden, but
we will bear it. Our Yankee friends to the North and East may not
want to be saved, but they should be saved too.”93
Other segregationists agreed. The same month that Brady
delivered his San Francisco speech, southern opponents of Brown
rejoiced when white parents in Brooklyn resisted an attempt by the
NAACP to have a school district in Bedford Stuyvesant, a
predominantly black neighborhood, rezoned to incorporate white
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students.94 Part of the hesitation resulted from increasing violence
at integrated schools in the Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick
neighborhoods. In November 1957, a special grand jury called to
investigate violence in New York City’s public schools called for
the assignment of police officers to patrol hallways after reports of
fights between students during class time.95 In January 1958, the
principal of John Marshall Junior High School, an integrated
Brooklyn school that had become the site of increasing disorder,
including the rape of a female student in the school’s basement,
committed suicide by jumping off the roof of his apartment
building before being scheduled to testify before a King’s County
grand jury investigating school violence.96
Southern voices were quick to point to New York’s
problems as a sign that integration was poor policy. “I ‘would hate
to think what the metropolitan press would have done to us’”
exclaimed Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, “if the Brooklyn
school violence had happened in Little Rock . . . people are not
being told one tenth of the trouble about racial problems outside
the South.”97 On February 5, 1958, Georgia Governor Herman
Talmadge announced that the citizens of Georgia were “deeply
sympathetic with the citizens of Brooklyn in the difficulties they
are experiencing in maintaining the independence and integrity of
their public schools.”98 Talmadge even went so far as to suggest
that “the President of the United States send Federal troops to
Brooklyn to preserve order in the public schools there in the same
manner that he did to force a new social order upon the public
schools of Little Rock, Arkansas.”99 As early as 1954, James O.
Eastland had asserted the importance of making the South’s case to
the nation, of rearticulating southern racial views and presenting
them at the foot of national opinion. Now this was happening.100

IV: THE MODERATE RESPONSE
While proponents of massive resistance like Brady and
Eastland adopted aspects of delinquency discourse – an interesting
development on its own – they failed to mount a successful legal
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challenge to Brown. This raises a question; to what extent did talk
of delinquency actually impact law? Was it simply a duplicitous,
discursive move? Or did it ultimately engender legal change?
Virginia provides an example. The birthplace of massive
resistance, Virginia also produced legal reformers interested in
bridging the gap between outright defiance and compliance. To
them, questions about child psychology and juvenile delinquency
were not simply propaganda tools, but substantive considerations
to be taken into account. Indeed, moderate leaders who did not
endorse massive resistance took an even more concerted interest in
juvenile crime than many extremists, proposing a variety of state
programs aimed at addressing troubled youth. In 1954, for
example, Governor Thomas Stanley appointed Kathryn Stone,
Arlington County’s Delegate to the General Assembly as
Chairman of the Governor’s Commission on Juvenile
Delinquency. Stone was one of Virginia’s most moderate, perhaps
even progressive leaders.
She voted against Harry F. Byrd’s
program of massive resistance and was one of four plaintiffs in a
case suing for fair reapportionment in Virginia.101 Following the
Supreme Court’s decision Baker v. Carr in 1962, she urged
citizens and legislators to take action with regard to the
malapportionment of Virginia’s legislature, arguing that northern
counties with greater populations should have a greater voice in the
legislature than the less populated Southside counties. Stone was
also active in the League of Women’s voters, served as Chairman
of the Governor’s Committee for Youth in Virginia, and belonged
to the Virginia Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission.102 During the height of civil rights unrest, Stone
extended her work to mental health, serving as a member of a state
Study Commission for Mental Health created in 1962, and joining
a Citizens Committee to implement recommendations of the
recently published Mental Health Planning Study.
Stone’s moderation stemmed from the political leanings
of her constituents, affluent, cosmopolitan denizens of Arlington, a
wealthy suburb of Washington DC. Unlike Virginia’s rural
southern “Southside” counties, Arlington boasted a relatively
cosmopolitan population, many drawn from other parts of the
country. At the same time, Arlington also bordered the D.C.
school system, one of the first in the country to be publicized by
segregationists intent on stopping Brown.
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In the 1955 race for Arlington county school board, echoes
of concerns voiced in the Deep South emerged in metropolitan
Virginia. Therman M. Lloyd, in a letter dated November 1, 1955
encouraged voters to elect L. H. Blevins, Willis F. Kern and Susan
O’Hara to the Arlington County School Board, warning that
“[y]our child’s future welfare can be undermined by close
association with children of the opposite color. At an age of
unawareness of racial and social differences, unwise attachments
can be and often are formed during school years that can result in
mixed marriages or worse. Is this risk fair to your child? People
of both races are concerned.”103
When Kathryn Stone appeared before the Governor’s
Commission on Public Education on November 15, 1954, she
articulated a rationale for resistance slightly softer than extremist
diatribes against the integration of D.C. schools. “I believe that
there is a possibility, as there must always be in the affairs of
men,” Stone began, “for a thoughtful and temperate education of
the mind and heart, in the best tradition of a Christian and libertyloving people whose basic tenet is respect for the individual
person.”104 Stone’s emphasis on the education of the mind and the
heart was not a call for blind acceptance of integration, but a plea
for non-divisive thinking about cultural and educational gaps
between white and black youth. “There is room for education of
those proponents of integration,” she continued, critiquing civil
rights activists, “who have never lived in a community with large
numbers of Negroes, many of whom still lack the cultural
background needed to make immediate and complete integration
practical.”105 Conversely, she maintained, “there is room for
education of those opponents of the principle of integration who
have not lived in a community with smaller numbers of Negroes,
many of whom have attained professional and cultural
103
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standing.”106 By contrasting African Americans of “professional
and cultural standing” to those who “lack” cultural background,
Stone brought to the fore a factor that few segregationists proved
willing to consider: class. That class might explain behavioral
differences better than race became a recurring theme in Stone’s
politics, providing her with a justification for state programs aimed
at addressing the problems of disadvantaged and delinquent youth.
Unlike John Bell Williams, who used D.C. schools to
discredit integration, Stone used problems in D.C. schools to lobby
for state services. Her campaign gained momentum in the wake of
a 1955 report issued by the National Council of Churches of Christ
positing that integration in D.C. schools was “uncovering health
and welfare problems, ‘half-concealed behind the curtain of
segregation.”107 Aware that the hopes of extremists were coming
true and that D.C. was becoming a topic of national interest, Stone
publicly opposed essentialist arguments that delinquency was a
factor of race and that parents of delinquent children should be
blamed for their plight. “There are social and cultural factors
working on children,” noted Stone during a talk to a group of
parents at Richmond’s Ginter Park Elementary School, “that
parents cannot control.”108 To aid struggling parents, Stone
endorsed the “establishment of a State Mobile Psychiatric Clinic
for youth,” as well as “a State-wide system of juvenile detention
homes”109
Other recommendations issued by Stone’s Commission
included improving the facilities at Virginia’s four state trainings
schools for delinquent youths, including detention facilities and
facilities for the treatment of maladjusted children.110 The
Commission also recommended measures that impacted all
children, including increased vocational training, and
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kindergarten.111 “Considerable evidence was presented,” asserted
a Commission report, “which indicates that delinquency arises
most easily among children of low grade intelligence. These
children find regular academic curricula too difficult, and their
constant failure frustrating.”112 To help such children, the
Commission recommended mental health programs in schools, “a
modified academic program, and trade or vocational training in
grades seven, eight, and nine.”113
The Commission also declared that something be done
about comic books. “The Commission believes that the General
Assembly should consider strengthening the statute controlling
salacious literature to provide more stringent penalties which
would specifically control the sale of crime and horror comic
books to minors. It should also consider whether to provide a
stronger statute against the dissemination of pornographic
literature and pictures.”114 Other laws recommended by the
Commission included providing for the development of regional
detention facilities, improving standards for kindergartens and
nursery schools, and providing for issuance of provisional
employment licenses.115
The Virginia Assembly followed much of the
Commission’s advice. In 1958, it enacted a law controlling comic
books, making it “[a] misdemeanor penalty” for “disseminating
comic books or other printed matter of an obscene nature or
tending to incite juveniles to crime.116 Virginia also enacted
legislation to control the presence of weapons in schools. “Switchblade knives are now included among weapons whose possession,
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use and sale are prohibited,” asserted the legislature in 1958.117
According to Alexandria legislator Armistead Booth, the
switchblade law was “perhaps desirable for protection of our white
brothers in view of the threatened breakdown in the segregation
pattern.”
While switchblade knives were probably a minor concern,
the state tackled larger problems of juvenile delinquency and youth
crime. Indeed, state concern over juvenile offenses was reflected
in several pieces of legislation, among them a law designed “to
make parents liable for actively contributing to the delinquency of
their children,” and a statute “to allow juvenile judges to make
public the names, offenses and parents of juvenile offenders.”118 In
addition to targeting parents, Virginia also moved “to require
juvenile social workers to report all knowledge of law violations
they obtain in their confidential investigations; and to allow a
juvenile to be jailed overnight on a warrant signed by a justice of
the peace, subject to being placed in the custody of the juvenile
court the following morning.”119 Another bill gave legislative
sanction to corporal punishment in the public schools. Though
teachers possessed the authority to administer corporal punishment
already, “legislators felt the enactment of a bill specifically
permitting it would have a healthful effect.”120
In May 1959, a symposium was held in Richmond on
welfare, education, and illegitimacy.121 That same year, the
Virginia Assembly considered a bill “[d]irecting the Virginia
Advisory Legislative Council to make a study relating to problems
concerning providing protective services and day-care facilities for
children.”122 On her copy of the bill, Kathryn Stone penciled a
note indicating that services provided directly to children in their
homes might be particularly effective. “[T]he providing of skilled
and adequate protective services to children in their own homes
117
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before coming into the juvenile court,” she observed, “can be a
means of restoring and preserving wholesome family life,” thereby
linking the day care of children to juvenile delinquency.123
Just as Stone supported increased outreach, so too did she
endorse improvements in state facilities for youth who had to be
removed from their homes. One of her most ambitious projects
was a state-of-the-art juvenile detention center near Arlington. To
her mind, the center was not “a catch-all solution to the problems
of juvenile delinquency” but rather “a link” in a much larger
“chain of community services designed to cope with juvenile
problems.”124
At a ceremony commemorating the center’s
completion, Governor Lindsay Almond attributed the facility to
Stone’s hard work. “It is to Delegate Kathryn Stone of Northern
Virginia,” Almond announced, “that the entire state owes a great
debt for her creative idea for this facility and for her superb
leadership in making it a reality.”125 Recognizing the difficulty
involved in pushing new programs through the state legislature,
Almond noted that talk of such a facility had begun “in the ‘40’s,”
but nothing was actually done about it until 1955, “when Del.
Kathryn Stone, Chairman of the Commission on Juvenile
Delinquency, made it a recommendation in her report.”126
Despite her success in expanding Virginia’s social safety
net, Stone was not able to stop a reactionary movement based in
the rural, southern counties of the state that called for massive
resistance to the Supreme Court. In 1956, for example, a special
commission boasting “heavy representation” from “Southside
areas – particularly the Fourth, Fifth and First congressional
districts – where Negro populations are relatively heavy,”
succeeded in thwarting moderate plans to end segregation by race
and impose pupil placement, or assignment plans.127 Opponents of
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this plan were quick to note that most of the commission’s support
came from “Tidewater, Southside, or near Southside counties.”128
By 1962, however, Stone and other “[u]rban
representatives” were able to overcome rural-based bills that
“[m]ade sterilization of mothers of illegitimate children
mandatory,” and “[e]mpowered juvenile authorities to transfer
delinquent children to adult prisons at their administrative
discretion.”129 This marked a larger shift in the nexus of political
power in Virginia, out of sparsely populated rural communities and
towards more populated urban ones.
That same year, Stone emphasized the development of
higher education, particularly community colleges.130 “‘The
development of higher education will be the most important issue
we’ll handle,’” announced Stone.131 But, she warned, the state
would no longer pursue “education for education’s sake,” but
would work instead “to develop technical education,” a necessary
goal if the Old Dominion wanted “to attract more developing
industries to the state.”132 The way to attain that end, according to
Mrs. Stone, was to (1) strengthen the public schools, (2) offer
technical training at a post-high school level and (3) expand the
community college program.133 “We need to keep youngsters in
school longer, anyway,” she asserted, noting that “[w]e must start
right now to develop a full youth program. For example, hundred
of boys between ages 16 and 21 are out of school and out of
work.’”134
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For idle children who got in trouble with the law, the
Virginia legislature approved “more than $1,000,000,” for the
operation of a new Virginia Treatment Center for Children at
Richmond.135 The Center had an in-patient capacity of 40 and was
able to handle a heavy out-patient service for “emotionally
disturbed children.”136 That same year, “A Committee for Youth
was established by resolution to contribute to the coordination,
strengthening and extension of present state services for youth and
to encourage programs locally that contribute to the prevention of
crime and delinquency.”137
One policy idea was to lower the legal age at which
children could begin working, and remove the state’s minimum
wage law to provide employers with incentives to hire children.
Unfortunately for Stone, however, both her minimum wage ban
and a bill which “would have permitted children to work in public
recreation facilities, outside school hours, with the consent of their
parents” were killed. Opponents rejected the argument that the
bills would “help reduce juvenile delinquency and be economically
helpful to many families.”138
Despite such setbacks, Kathryn Stone nevertheless boasted
considerable achievements in Virginia during her tenure. Among
her greatest accomplishments were laws that established a mobile
psychiatric clinic, a state system of regional detention homes and a
treatment center for emotionally disturbed youths. Another
success was the creation of a Governor’s Committee for Youth to
study how young people were being educated and trained for the
changing job market. She also campaigned for a mental hospital in
Northern Virginia, the Northern Virginia Technical College and
for expansion of state colleges and universities.139
Such measures combined to form both a more intrusive and
more nurturing state, one markedly different to the one that
prevailed prior to Brown. Prior to Brown, southern states skimped
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on social services to both blacks and whites, resulting in a type of
governmental vacuum when it came to state aid. That Brown
encouraged state leaders to fill this vacuum is worth noting.
Though generally remembered for sparking massive resistance,
Kathryn Stone’s delinquency efforts indicate that Brown had a type
of transformative effect on state formation in the region as well.

V. DEMONSTRATORS & DELINQUENTS IN DANVILLE
Of course, like all reform efforts Kathryn Stone’s did not
come without their complications. In fact, events in Virginia took
a turn for the worse in 1963 when black demonstrators began to
protest in Danville.140 Located near the North Carolina border in
Virginia’s Southside, Danville boasted tobacco processing plants, a
Corning Glass factory, and the Dan River Mills, a massive
operation employing thousands of local workers.141
Danville also boasted a relatively hard-line segregationist
past. In 1883, white residents gunned down African Americans in
the street in a bid to disrupt a burgeoning alliance between black
Republicans and liberal white “Readjusters.”142 In 1906, blacks
protested the introduction of segregated streetcars to the city, only
to meet an intransigent white response.143 Fifty years later, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education met a
resolute wall of resistance. According to local legislator C. Stuart
Wheatley, public education would be abandoned before blacks
were admitted to white schools, as “an integrated school is worse
than a closed school.”144
Tired of waiting for whites to comply with Brown, Danville
blacks took matters into their own hands, drawing inspiration from
civil rights demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963.145
Beginning on May 31 of that year, black demonstrators staged a
series of marches through downtown Danville “impeding traffic
and downtown business.”146 On June 5, black activists actually sat
down in the middle of one of the city’s busiest streets, “blocking
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all traffic.”147 Desperate to resume order, local police called on
Danville Corporation Court Judge Archibald Aiken, who pursuant
to Virginia law possessed the authority to “suppress riots, routs,
and unlawful assemblies.”148
Though Aiken failed to disperse the protesters, he quickly
issued an injunction ordering the demonstrators off “the public
streets,” and away from “entrances and exits to and from both
private business concerns and public facilities.”149 When the black
activists refused to comply, Aiken ordered a grand jury
investigation into the protests’ leaders and subsequently sanctioned
a wave of arrests.150 By mid-June over one hundred black
demonstrators had been arrested and jailed for contempt.151
Many of the black demonstrators were under eighteen and
treated as juvenile delinquents.152 Rather than enter the adult
system where they could invoke their constitutional rights, many
found themselves shuttled into the very youth services that
Kathryn Stone had sponsored, deprived of legal representation.153
Meanwhile, the demonstrators’ parents were arrested for the
unlikely crime of “contributing to the delinquency of a minor,” an
offense that escaped the attention of civil rights attorneys like
William Kunstler, who successfully received a stay for the other
demonstrators violating Aiken’s injunction.154 Many of the
unfortunate parents accused of corrupting their children did not
have their convictions overturned until 1973.155
Though Danville certainly did not typify the manner in
which Virginia’s delinquency statutes were enforced, it did
indicate larger problems with juvenile law. Though advocates like
Kathryn Stone intended for such laws to embody the principle of
parens patriae, or parental care, they were easily manipulated.
Indeed, by 1966 the Supreme Court felt it necessary to formalize
delinquency proceedings, making them more like criminal trials
precisely to protect juvenile defendants.156 The first case in which
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the Supreme Court ventured down this path came – ironically –
from D.C., a fitting factor given the early attention that the District
had attracted for delinquency in its integrated schools.157 The
appellant in the case, Morris Kent, was arrested in 1959 for
“several housebreakings and an attempted purse snatching.”158
Two years later he was arrested again after police discovered one
of his fingerprints at a rape scene.159 Appalled, the juvenile court
judge waived his exclusive jurisdiction of the case and transferred
Kent to an adult prison without any kind of hearing or legal
proceeding.160
Though the Supreme Court did not sympathize with Kent,
it bridled at the juvenile judge’s failure to provide the minor with
any kind of due process, not to mention parens patriae, or parental
care. “While there can be no doubt of the original laudable
purpose of juvenile courts,” asserted the majority’s opinion,
“studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to
whether actual performance measures well enough against
theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process
from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults.”161
Thinking not, the Court remanded Kent’s conviction, holding that
petitioner was “entitled to a hearing” and deserved “access by his
counsel” to “social records,” “reports,” and “a statement of reasons
for the Juvenile Court’s decision.”162
Though the beginning of the end for informal juvenile
delinquency proceedings, Kent revealed a complex, if oddly
parallel relationship to Brown. Both cases disrupted local practice
to build a constitutional firewall around youth. Yet, while Brown
encouraged the expansion of state services for youth, Kent made
those services look more like the adult criminal system. Here,
recovering the manner in which Brown both heightened fears of
delinquency and encouraged states like Virginia to expand their
youth services is important, precisely because it helps us to
understand how the decline of Jim Crow sparked the growth of
new forms of state regulation and control. That the Supreme Court
then had to intervene to regulate these forms is ironic, even if it
reinforces our understanding of the Court as a catalyst for
institutional if not social change.163
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CONCLUSION
As the stories of Danville and Kathryn Stone indicate,
concerns over the intersection of desegregation and juvenile
delinquency spawned a complex series of interactions between
Supreme Court constitutionalism and state law in the 1950s and
60s. Such interactions have gone largely unnoticed yet are worth
recovering for at least three reasons. First, popular concerns over
juvenile delinquency help to explain why NAACP lawyers like
Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg proceeded with arguably
flimsy evidence documenting the negative effects that segregation
had on African American children.164 Though pilloried for lacking
scientific rigor, such evidence made sense given the strategic way
that it intersected with popular concerns over youth.165 Two, just
as Marshall and Greenberg became influenced by media portrayals
of delinquency, so too did the constitutional politics of Brown
generally became implicated in the popular culture of the period,
as civil rights lawyers and segregationists alike invoked popular
fears over youth crime, including experts on comic books and
films like Blackboard Jungle to further their interests.166 Such
cultural constitutionalism, for lack of a better term, deepens our
understanding of the terrain upon which the struggle over public
school integration was fought, even as it pushes us to rethink the
impact which that struggle had on American law. Looking at the
state of Virginia, we see that Brown not only engendered massive
resistance, but triggered a transformation in state services to youth,
indicating a type of butterfly effect that had little to do with civil
rights or schools.167 Here, the Court’s opinion emerges neither as a
civil rights triumph nor a hollow hope, to borrow from Gerald
Rosenberg, but a catalyst for structural changes in the function and
form of the state.168
Though such transformations ended up having mixed
effects for youth, they did not simply arise out of a desire to
repress. Though certain extremists certainly did maintain a stated
interest in furthering racial repression, most respondents to Brown
articulated resistance in preservationist, bio-political terms.
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Understanding such terms – and the type of aspirational goals they
reflect – provides a piece in the larger puzzle of explaining the
perpetuation of racial inequality – yet decline in racism – in the
Twenty-First Century United States.
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